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ab s t r a c t
Since Blood Simple, the first film they wrote and directed together, the 
Coen Brothers have been working their way up in the film world and, 
in spite of their outside-the-mainstream taste for the noir and the sur-
real, have earned a  number of prestigious prizes. After Fargo, one of 
their most critically acclaimed films, expectations were high, and when 
the Brothers released their next bizarre venture, most critics rushed to 
measure it against Fargo’s success. Consequently, The Big Lebowski, the 
Coens’ 1998 neo-noir detective comedy, was considered an incoherent, 
“unsatisfactory” medley of genres and styles and a box office bomb, and 
nothing hinted that this unorthodox story of mistaken identity, featuring 
a pot-smoking, unemployed character named the Dude as its “hee-ro,” 
would gain a following. Yet, since its 1998 DVD release, The Big Lebowski 
has been hailed as the first cult film of the Internet, continuously inspir-
ing versatile cultural phenomena as nonconformist in their nature as the 
movie itself. This essay examines particular factors which initially might 
have been responsible for alienating the audience only to help The Big 
Lebowski become a peculiar cultural event in later years. It looks at The 
Big Lebowski’s characters, the historical time and place of the film’s action 
as well as at various external historical events, phenomena, places and peo-
ple such as, for example, the Port Huron Statement, the Reagan-Bush era, 
Los Angeles and its immigration issues, racial minorities, civil rights activ-
ists, the Western genre and, last but not least, Arnold Schwarzenegger. 
Reflecting the film’s oddities, this bag of cultural idiosyncrasies appears to 
provide some plausible explanations for The Big Lebowski’s unexpected, 
against-all-odds rise from the marginal position of a critical and commer-
cial failure to the status of a cult classic and cultural landmark.
ab s t r a c t




TThere is no accounting for taste. Specifically, there is no accounting for the public’s taste when it comes to art, especially in a country where pos-sibly every other nation in the world is bound to have a  representative. Of course, given the right time and place, taste can change, providing an opportunity for yet another from-rags-to-riches story in which a commer-cial failure rises to a cult classic and a cultural phenomenon of unexpected proportions. In 1998, the Coen Brothers’ neo-noir detective comedy The 
Big Lebowski1 failed the taste not only of the average American, but also of 
the Sundance Film Festival audience and critics who rated the movie with 
quite a  few walkouts (cf. Howell). An unnamed British reviewer in The 
Guardian branded TBL as “an unsatisfactory film,” trading “the tautness 
that won Fargo such acclaim for a loose, meandering outline” (“Big”). The 
same anonymous author doomed the film by calling it “infuriating” and 
prophesying that it “will win no prizes” (“Big”). Due to a different cultural 
sensibility and, possibly, the specific sense of humour famously attributed 
to the Small Island, the British fortune-teller-turned-critic might be es-
sentially forgiven for disregarding the movie’s potential which, with time, 
would meander way ahead of Fargo in public acclaim. Yet, some natives 
of the Big Country were equally unenthusiastic, regardless of which part 
of the US they came from. The New York Daily News movie critic Dave 
Kehr hybrid-titled his review “Coen Brothers’ Latest Is a Big Letdown-
ski Comedy about Druggie Bowler Strikes Out and Its Tired Film Noir 
Plot Is a Turkey” (Kehr), and as if this lexical and stylistic abuse was not 
atrocious enough, Kehr tautologizes by berating the Coens for dropping 
their main character “in the middle of one of their standard film noir plots, 
a vein they’ve been vigorously overworking from Blood Simple to Fargo,” 
and for “ask[ing] him to behave like a professional crime-stopper” (Kehr). 
According to Kehr, the Coens’ story is “a tired idea, and it produces an 
episodic, unstrung film.”
Many other reviewers have deemed the movie’s alleged lack of “taut-
ness” in narrative and cinematic style to be an almost unforgivable sin, 
branding TBL as “a bunch of ideas shovelled into a bag and allowed to spill 
out at random” (“Big”), “the Coens’ gaudy bag of tricks, whose clever-
ness and imagination exist mainly for their own sake” (Rosenbaum), or 
a narrative in which “the story line is in truth disjointed, incoherent and 
1 Instead of the full title, the abbreviation TBL will be used in most cases throughout 
the essay. Also, all the quotations from the film will be parenthetically cited with the 
abbreviation TBL, with three exceptions where, in order to preserve the characteristic 
spelling of some words, two block quotations and one action description are provided from 
the printed screenplay and accordingly indicated.
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even irritating” (Turran). Certainly, as Fred Ashe more recently and less 
aggressively points out, TBL defies “the constraints of literary form by 
stitching together a variety of genres: the noir detective story . . . , the 
Busby Berkeley musical, the Vietnam movie, the pornographic movie, the 
screwball comedy, the buddy film, and the 1960s romantic quest à la Easy 
Rider” (55). Such “stitching together” may be a challenge for the storyline, 
and yet, Pulp Fiction or Clerks, both released four years prior to TBL, were 
spectacular successes, although neither of these two culturally significant 
phenomena can boast a  particularly linear or coherent narrative. Also, 
even if TBL mixes genres and exhibits an arbitrary narrative technique, 
the story is not emotionally draining in a heavy postmodern way in which, 
for instance, Gilliam’s 1998 adaptation of Thompson’s Fear and Loathing 
in Las Vegas may appear to be to some viewers. Thus, the critical com-
plaints about the movie’s stylistic and narrative incoherence hardly seem 
a legitimate reason for TBL’s initial lack of public acclaim, especially that, 
as Roger Ebert observes, the way TBL “rushes in all directions and never 
ends up anywhere” is not “the film’s flaw, but its style,” cohering with the 
lifestyle of the main character:
The Dude, who smokes a lot of pot and guzzles White Russians made 
with half-and-half, starts every day filled with resolve, but his plans 
gradually dissolve into a haze of missed opportunities and missed inten-
tions. . . . The spirit is established right at the outset, when the narrator 
(Sam Elliott) starts out well enough, but eventually confesses he’s lost 
his train of thought. (Ebert)
One might argue that TBL’s unexpected rise from its critically and 
commercially marginal position to the status of an almost unprecedented 
cult film in the years following its DVD release stems from the fact that 
the Coens’ creation embodies their “inspired, absurdist taste for weird, 
peculiar Americana [and] their own bizarre subgenre” (Howe) as well as 
some more traditional, even if largely revised, American values. TBL is 
“perhaps the only psychowesternoircheechandchonginvietnambuddy gen-
re pic in existence” (Comentale and Jaffe 3), and, as such, testifies to an 
outlandish amalgam of individualism and creativity, the two crucial prereq-
uisites of the American way to wealth. The mixture of genres reflects the 
versatility of American culture and refers to important historical events, 
while the movie’s commercial fate is a postmodern spin on the American 
Dream myth, in which there is no hero but just the Dude who is “the lazi-
est [man] in Los Angeles County . . . which would place him high in the 
runnin’ for laziest worldwide” (TBL). To make some more sense of why 
this independent, marginal medley of genres, styles and peculiar characters 
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alienated the audience at first and then “went out and achieved anyway” 
(TBL) without following any methods for success, it might be beneficial 
to examine more closely the essential elements contributing to the creation 
of any text: the time, the place and the characters. In TBL, all these com-
ponents exhibit some amount of otherness, marginality, and asynchronism 
with the expectations of the American middle class, the targeted audience 
of most American movies, while invariably addressing classic elements of 
US culture.
At the beginning of the movie, the Stranger, the story’s cowboy-type 
frame narrator, announces, 
A way out west there was a fella, fella I want to tell you about, fella by 
the name of Jeff Lebowski. . . . This Lebowski, he called himself the 
Dude. . . . Now this story I’m about to unfold took place back in the 
early nineties—just about the time of our conflict with Sad’m and the 
Eye-rackies. I only mention it ’cause sometimes there’s a man—I won’t 
say a hee-ro, ’cause what’s a hee-ro?—but sometimes there’s a man . . . 
and I’m talkin’ about the Dude here—sometimes there’s a man who, wal, 
he’s the man for his time’n place, he fits right in there—and that’s the 
Dude, in Los Angeles. (Coen and Coen 3–4)
Set in the early 1990s, the movie, however, hardly ever refers to the 
Gulf War, while frequently bringing up the Vietnam War through multiple 
ramblings of the Dude’s bowling pal Walter Sobchak, a Vietnam veteran. 
Unlike Walter, the Dude is a pacifist, a pot-smoking, laid-back hippie stuck 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, the heyday of the civil rights movement, 
when, as he himself claims, he helped to draft the Port Huron Statement 
(1962) and was one of the members of the Seattle Seven (1970), the two 
radical student-based anti-war ventures of the New Left. Among its mul-
tiple principles defining what was wrong with America of the 1960s and 
what steps should be taken to amend the warped democracy, the Port Hu-
ron Statement condemned “the pervasiveness of racism in American life,” 
the perils of “the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of the Bomb,” 
and the international “uncontrolled exploitation . . . of the earth’s physical 
resources” (“Port Huron”), all of which had been long neglected by the 
United States government, mostly on account of the country’s enduring 
involvement in the financially exploitive Vietnam War, a frequent reference 
in the film. The Statement’s supporters proclaimed that racism, possible 
nuclear extinction and environmental disaster “either directly oppressed” 
them “or rankled [their] consciences and became [their] own subjective 
concerns,” leading them “to see complicated and disturbing paradoxes in 
[their] surrounding America” as well as the hollowness of the nation’s 
founding declaration that “all men are created equal” and should be able 
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to pursue happiness in a war-free country and world (“Port Huron”). Pro-
fessing “we are a minority,” the Port Huron activists knew how important 
but also how marginal to “the vast majority of . . . people” their views at 
the time were (“Port Huron”). In 1969, replacing the vacuum created by 
the collapse of the national Students for a Democratic Society, the lead-
ers of the Seattle Liberation Front, founded by University of Washington 
professor Michael Lerner, were tried and briefly imprisoned after the anti-
Vietnam war demonstration on February 17, 1970 in front of the Federal 
Courthouse in downtown Seattle (“Seattle”). 
Based on a real member of the Seattle Seven, the Coens’ friend Jeff 
Dowd, the character of Jeffrey the Dude Lebowski is a retired-civil rights 
activist, who finds himself at the end of the Reagan-Bush era with his aver-
sion to aggression intact, but with no radical anti-war ventures to fuel his 
existence. The Persian Gulf War did not last long enough to call for any 
significant anti-war demonstrations and actually earned the Republican 
president national support. Although any specific references to the po-
litical climate of the country or the L.A. region are absent from the story, 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Los Angeles County, as well as most 
other regions of Southern California, “remained under the stewardship of 
a countersubversive coalition that targeted civil rights crusaders, feminists, 
antiwar demonstrators, and gay activists as culpable for the social ills and 
economic malaise wrought by economic restructuring, deindustrialization, 
and the dismantling of the welfare state” (Avila 234). Generally, “[l]iberal-
ism in all its forms was anathema” during the Reagan-Bush administration 
(Glazer 234). Upon the Dude’s visit to claim compensation for his soiled 
rug, the poser millionaire Lebowski, with whom the Dude is confused at 
the beginning of the story, also reminds him that the Dude’s “revolution 
is over” and that “the bums will always lose” (TBL). Even in the Dude’s 
own words, he is essentially someone who “the square community does 
not give a shit about” (TBL). 
Such anti-liberal circumstances could hardly make the Dude fit “right 
in there,” and yet, the Dude remains comfortable within the film’s his-
torical setting. This laid-back attitude, however, might be what initially 
encumbered his appeal at the time of the film’s release in the late 1990s. 
In the early 1990s, limiting his protests to professing pacifism, the Dude 
poses as a  mere reminder of the radical New Left individualism which 
once challenged the government by “opposing the Vietnam War, working 
for free speech and civil rights, and practicing civil disobedience” (Stacey 
Thompson 126). Thus, in essence, the Dude was to the protest period of 
the Vietnam War what Thoreau had been to the imperialistic period of the 
Mexican-American War, while in the early 1990s, he exemplifies a hippie 
version of Rip Van Winkle on whom “the changes of states and empires 
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made but little impression” (Irving 991). As Fred Ashe points out, both 
Rip and the Dude lack “masculine aggression” and seem “unfazed” by the 
respective wars referred to “in both texts [which] come off as inconsequen-
tial and serve primarily to highlight the thematic war between aggressive 
American striving and passive American slacking” (Ashe 48, 49). In 1998, 
during the second term of Clinton’s presidency, the overtly liberal image 
of an economically unproductive, unburdened and unconcerned hippie, 
who definitely inhales more than once within 112 minutes of his screen ap-
pearance, failed to fit in the country’s economically thriving frame, which 
is to a certain extent surprising, considering the number and popularity of 
slacker films and television shows released around this time period, such 
as, for instance, Wayne’s World (1992), Beavis and Butt-Head (1993–1997), 
or Clerks (1994). In Doing Nothing: A History of Loafers, Loungers, Slack-
ers, and Bums in America, Tom Lutz observes that although “many of the 
slackers of the 1990s and beyond have not felt much power to change the 
world” the way that the 1950s and 1960s rebels did (299), the 1990s slacker 
“characters [do] have jobs, just not good jobs” (285). The work-shy Dude, 
on the other hand, helped move history forward in the 1960s, but, ironi-
cally, got stuck there and, thus, has more in common with the loafers of 
the past, even distant past (e.g. Rip Van Winkle, Bartleby or Huck Finn), 
than with the 1990s counterculture in which many indolent individuals 
managed their “disregard for the world of employment [only] very brief-
ly” (Lutz 286), accepting mediocre jobs over total rejection of work. As 
a result, in 1998, the Dude turned out to be an outsider even in the world 
of outsiders and, thus, might have seemed a little redundant to the audi-
ence. Pondering on what “a Lebowski” is and how the phenomenon exists 
in the world, the editors of The Year’s Work in Lebowski Studies observe,
At first glance, we can reasonably assert that it is not a tool, in the same 
way, say, a hammer . . . or a heavy drink may be a tool. In fact, compared 
to the familiar things on our domestic shelving units, this one seems to 
lack any obvious purpose, any implicit use or application to aid either the 
individual or the community. The actual viewing experience pro duces 
nothing, accomplishes nothing, changes nothing. In fact, Lebowski-
users—the “achievers”—use the film to avoid work, and whatever force 
or energy they might apply in their endeavor is clearly unmatched by 
any obvious input. (Comentale and Jaffe 3)
While other cinematic slacker characters might appear equally unpro-
ductive in what they have to offer to the viewers, the Dude surpasses all 
of them in failing to meet any expectations of the audience and society by 
“reject[ing] such traditional markers of American self-hood as family, ca-
reer, religion, [and] even his given name” (Ashe 52). In the Rip Van Winkle 
82
Katarzyna Małecka
manner, “the Dude drifts through life guided by no personal code more 
tangible than the desire to live free of care” (Ashe 52), but even in this 
characteristic he outmatches Irving’s protagonist, because the middle-aged 
Dude has no family to neglect and, therefore, avoids the accusation of being 
an irresponsible husband and father. 
Yet, a couple of years after its 1998 DVD release, The Big Lebowski 
and the Dude must have benefitted many individuals and more than one 
community, giving rise to such cultural phenomena as: annual Lebowski 
Fests, which originated in 2002 in Louisville, Kentucky, and since 2004 
have been “replicated . . .  in other locations: Las Vegas, New York, Los 
Angeles, Austin, Seattle, London, [and] Edinburgh” (Comentale and Jaffe 
23); Dudeism, “a religion deeply inspired by The Big Lebowski, as well as 
several other traditions that predate Lebowski—most particularly: Taoism, 
Zen Buddhism, American Transcendentalism and humanism” (“Dude-
ism”); I’m a Lebowski, You’re a Lebowski: Life, the Big Lebowski and What 
Have You, a 2007 book by the Lebowski Fest organizers, prefaced by the 
Dude (Jeff Bridges) himself and including interviews with most of the 
movie’s cast; and at least one academic study, The Year’s Work in Lebowski 
Studies, a 2009 insightful collection of essays by scholars referred to in the 
present Lebowski essay. This, of course, is just the crème de la crème of the 
Lebowski cult, the beginnings of which “are shrouded in mystery, thriv-
ing elsewhere in multiple viewings, late-night campus screenings, recita-
tions of catch-phrases, drinking games, and theme parties” (Comentale 
and Jaffe 23). In 2007, commenting on the upcoming Lebowski Fest UK 
in Edinburgh, Liz Hoggard gave TBL its British share of credit by interest-
ingly accentuating the film’s bizarre achievement through the recollection 
of its unsuccessful beginnings:
The plot is frankly unfathomable. The film bombed at the box office. 
And yet many fans consider the Coen brothers’ The Big Lebowski 
a work of ‘cinematic pop poetry,’ and Observer readers rate it the sev-
enth funniest film ever. Back in 1998 when it was first released the film 
was considered a flop, but it has now sold more than 20 million copies on 
DVD. One Wall Street firm even interviews candidates by throwing lines 
of the film at them—to see if they can pick up on them. 
Establishing oneself on Wall Street via mere linguistic impact is an un-
questionable achievement in itself, making one wonder which exchange 
of lines in particular would result in being hired at that particular firm. 
The likely winner seems the scene where the millionaire Lebowski asks the 
less than casually clad Dude (his jelly sandals are a touch of sheer genius), 
“You don’t go out looking for a job dressed like that? On a weekday?” to 
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which the Dude responds with a question, “Is this a... what day is this?” 
(TBL). In hindsight, had TBL been released in 2002, the film might have 
been received with much more enthusiasm. In spite of its apparent lack 
of social and cultural commentary or usefulness, TBL can be experienced 
as a healthy cultural balance to the American obsession with measuring 
one’s life through economic success and the trite US policy of manifest 
destiny. In the prosperous late 1990s, however, few felt the need for such 
balance because who really needs to see what is wrong when things are 
going right and the only legitimate concern is the president’s sex life. Ap-
plying Bakhtin’s concepts of the carnivalesque to TBL, Paul Martin and 
Valerie Renegar observe,
[I]n the late 1990s, the United States was enjoying a period of economic 
and social prosperity. . . . Consequently, most Americans were not recep-
tive to social critiques that TBL had to offer. However, in the interven-
ing years, the cultural landscape has shifted in several important areas. 
With a flagging economy, an extended and bloody war with Iraq, and 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States has increasingly 
become a  place where the mainstream media tends to legitimate only 
official points of view and political dissent is unpopular. The latter tends 
to be “swallowed by the big official spin” (Griffen 279), creating a void 
in popular critical discourse. With this void begging to be filled by those 
left voiceless and powerless, The Big Lebowski has become even more 
relevant today.
It is hardly coincidental then that the first Lebowski Fest, very much 
a carnivalesque event, was held on October 12th, 2002 at Fellowship Lanes 
in Louisville, Kentucky. Although “this inaugural year was a bit tame,” as 
“Fellowship Lanes is a Baptist run bowling alley which didn’t allow drink-
ing or cussing” (“Lebowski Fest”), the very fact that this less than liberal 
state has become home to an annual event celebrating the Coens’ unruly 
creation proves that, to quote Walter quoting Theodor Herzl, “if you will 
it, it is no dream” (TBL). In the parlance of the capitalist Lebowski, over 
time, TBL has met challenges, bested competitors (none of the 1990s 
slacker movies can boast this amount of attention in the age of technol-
ogy), overcome obstacles (cf. TBL), and made the social and cultural op-
posites meet within and without its historical timeframe, while eluding 
easy classification all along. 
TBL spaces out of time on many levels and in many directions, almost 
as surrealistically as the knocked out Dude does flying over the Los An-
geles nightscape in the first dream sequence. The location of TBL marks, 
reflects and coheres with the film’s cultural marginality, oddities and rejec-
tion of narrative discipline, which might help throw some more light on 
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the shift in TBL’s status. At the outset of the story, the Stranger muses in 
his Texan drawl, 
A way out west there was a fella, . . . fella by the name of Jeff Lebowski. 
. . . This Lebowski, he called himself the Dude. Now, Dude, that’s a name 
no one would self-apply where I come from. But then, there was a  lot 
about the Dude that didn’t make a whole lot of sense to me. And a lot 
about where he lived, likewise. But then again, maybe that’s why I found 
the place s’durned innarestin’. (Coen and Coen 3)
The Stranger comments on the regional and cultural differences of his 
country, pointing out that the Dude and his place of residence intrigue 
him because they both elude his Southern logic. After this introduction, 
according to the script’s action description, “the smoggy vastness of Los 
Angeles [at twilight] stretches out before us” (Coen and Coen 3), and the 
Stranger adds, “They call Los Angeles the City of Angels. I didn’t find 
it to be that exactly, but I’ll allow it as there are some nice folks there” 
(Coen and Coen 3). The Stranger represents the American invention of 
“that most mythic individual hero, the cowboy, who again and again saves 
a society he can never completely fit into” (Bellah at al. 145). Less solemn 
in nature than Will Kane and with a Dude-like attitude towards his role as 
narrator, this cowboy, a  literal American “Stranger” in L.A., is just such 
an individual to whom city life does not “make a whole lot of sense” and 
for whom his home prairie territory promises openness and freedom, in 
contrast to “the massive electrical L.A. grid that the film’s opening se-
quence lingers on” (Ashe 47). With his Southern accent and cowboy gear, 
the narrator stands out in the bowling alley, and yet, when midway through 
the story the Dude casually compliments the Stranger’s outfit, the city 
setting suddenly becomes more complimentary as well, and the Dude, in 
his stretched-out sweater, might be perceived as a reluctant cowboy-type 
himself.
Located between the Mojave desert and the Pacific ocean, Los An-
geles, both metaphorically and geographically, traps the free flow of the 
American West and, as a profit-hungry and economically exploitative me-
tropolis, “presages the end of individual autonomy as a primary feature of 
American life” (Ashe 47). And yet, with its most famous district, Holly-
wood, responsible for popularizing the cowboy image and, thus, enhanc-
ing the mythic image of American individualism and self-reliance, as well 
as with “more artists, writers, filmmakers, actors, dancers and musicians 
living and working [there] than [in] any other city at any time in the his-
tory of civilization” (“Only”), the City of Angels also poses as an almost 
God-like place, providing unlimited creative opportunities for various in-
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dividuals, many of whom happen to be as outlandish in their lifestyles as 
the Coens’ artistic output and, thus, frequently referred to as “freaks.” 
One of the most succinct literary references rendering the cultural am-
biance of this city, a  place uninhibited by Puritan heritage, comes from 
Hunter S. Thompson’s Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas: A Savage Journey to 
the Heart of the American Dream. Halfway through their drug-infused Las 
Vegas escapade, having violated most social norms for the sake of testing 
and exposing the downsides of the American Dream, Raoul Duke, based 
on Thompson himself, decides to decline his Samoan attorney’s telegram 
invitation to report to the Dunes Hotel for more abuse of everything that 
can be abused, as he thinks he “pushed” his “luck about as far as it was 
going to carry [him] in this town . . . all the way out to the edge” (78). 
Consequently, he plans his escape back to L.A., 
There is only one road to L.A.—US Interstate 15, a straight run with no 
backroads or alternate routes, just a flat-out high-speed burn through 
Baker and Barstow and Berdoo and then on the Hollywood Freeway 
straight into frantic oblivion: safety, obscurity, just another freak in the 
Freak Kingdom. (Hunter S. Thompson 83)
While both cities could easily compete for the American Dream myth 
capital, Duke, with whom the Dude incidentally has a lot in common, finds 
Los Angeles, even at the peak of its 1970s racial tensions, to be a place 
where someone like him feels relatively secure, possibly because, unlike 
Las Vegas, Los Angeles tends to be less “relentlessly middle-class, middle-
income, and middle-aged” (cf. Whissen 90), which, from the standpoint 
of unbridled, financially broke individuals unconcerned with time, like 
Duke or the Dude, is definitely a good thing, allowing such outsiders not 
to have too much money and ambition, and yet still enjoy life on their 
own terms in this predominantly “two-class [region] of haves and have-
nots” (Whissen 90). Ambition, the pressure for success and money are 
there but so is the choice not to do too much or to do things weirdly and 
differently. Reporting back on Lebowski Fest West, which finally took 
place in L.A. in 2005, a LEO weekly journalist observes that in spite of 
the discomforting attention the fest staff were getting from the cameras 
documenting the event, the commotion and interest “still seemed like 
nothing to L.A.—a city whose smoggy breath continually warps your ho-
rizon as fast as it cranks out more freaks to draw the attention away from 
you” (Titan). Trapped between two geographical extremes, yet expanding 
over an impressively vast area with several independent cities attached to 
or engulfed by it, Los Angeles liberally allows over-the-top otherness as 
much as obliterates it, only to spout out more bizarreness. Unlike TBL at 
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the time of its original release, the L.A. Lebowski Fest of 2005 managed 
to make a mark in the region, selling out entirely for its two-day celebra-
tion and disappointing “the countless people who planned on attending 
but were caught unaware of the power of the Lebowskifest” (Titan). The 
Entertainment Capital of the World clearly underestimated the impact 
of its own marginal creation which did not benefit the city’s economy in 
1998 when it was born, but, like Frankenstein’s creature, came back to 
claim its position.
Just as TBL stitches together genres and “suggests . . . laid-back con-
nections between more or less disparate phenomena” (Comentale and 
Jaffe 5) (e.g. the Dude’s Wizard of Oz-like pair of bowling shoes handed 
to him by a Saddam look-alike, the wicked wizard of Western Asia, in the 
second dream sequence), Los Angeles stitches together a unique variety 
of cultures from within and without America. After having been captured 
from the Mexicans by US forces in 1846, this west-coast area speedily be-
came an American “bastion of middle-class whiteness” (Avila 230), only to 
renegotiate these conditions and rebalance its predominantly white popu-
lation at the end of the twentieth century: 
Since 1970, the vast influx of immigrant populations into Southern Cali-
fornia has transformed the region . . . into a  Third World citadel. In 
1970, 71 percent of Los Angeles County’s population was non-Hispanic 
white or Anglo, and the remaining 29 percent of the population was di-
vided among Latinos (15 percent), African Americans (11 percent), and 
Asian/Pacific Islanders (3 percent). By 1980, the non-Hispanic white 
population had dropped to 53 percent, and ten years later it had fallen 
further to 41 percent. . . . By 1990, Latinos comprised 36 percent of the 
city’s population; African Americans and Asians constituted 11 percent, 
respectively. Today’s Los Angeles ranks among the most diverse urban 
regions in the world and the city once heralded as the “nation’s white 
spot” now mirrors the polyglot diversity that defines the city and even 
its past. (Avila 230)
Such cultural and political changes might also partially account for 
TBL’s rather moderate reception in 1998. In order “to preserve white he-
gemony,” “[i]n the 1990s, California voters passed a series of measures that 
targeted immigrant groups and racial minorities,” for instance Proposition 
13, which “drastically reduced property taxes at the expense of public ser-
vices such as schools, libraries, and police and fire protection, services that 
racial minorities have been increasingly forced to rely on” (Avila 232, 233). 
The threat that speedily growing non-white minorities were perceived to 




One year after the end of the Reagan-Bush era and on the heels of the 
Rodney King uprising of 1992, the film Falling Down engendered con-
troversy among national audiences for its neonoir portrayal of the white 
man’s identity crisis in contemporary Los Angeles. “D-Fens, ” an unem-
ployed engineer suffering a nervous breakdown, begins a killing spree 
as he walks from downtown Los Angeles to the beach. In the tradition 
of noir’s white male antihero, D-Fens trudges through the racialized 
milieu of the city, attacking a Korean market, a fast-food outlet, a Chi-
cano gang, and a neo-Nazi. The city that once resonated with compelling 
expressions of suburban whiteness is now alien territory for D-Fens, 
an inhospitable non-Anglo landscape that renders white male identity 
obsolete. (Avila 234)
Falling Down became a box office hit because the misunderstood pro-
tagonist is a  military type who, like a  lonely cowboy, fights violence in 
search of justice at the time of white flight. Six years later, with an even 
greater upsurge in immigration and powerful cultural changes in the re-
gion, the Coens’ neonoir “Western at the limit of the West” (Comentale 
and Jaffe 6) might have seemed oddly out of place. If D-Fens aka Wil-
liam Foster (Michael Douglas) indicates “the fin de siècle crisis of white 
male identity” (Avila 234), the image of an unemployed, family-shunning 
hippie could hardly have helped enhance this identity in 1998, and, thus, 
might not have initially resonated with white male Americans, or their 
wives. Moreover, in spite of lacking aggression himself, the Dude’s charac-
ter, with his 1960s pacifist mind-set and liberal attitude even towards the 
nihilists who burn his car, might, by association and quite ironically, bring 
to mind more radical and culturally resonant acts of violence which L.A. 
gave vent to at a time of rapidly increasing immigration and the civil rights 
movement, such as Robert Kennedy’s 1968 assassination at the Ambas-
sador Hotel, “the gruesome spectacle of the Manson family” or the 1970 
killing of Rubén Salazar, who was “held up as a  martyr in the struggle 
against Chicano oppression” (Avila 227). The majority of whites in South-
ern California were prone to blaming the non-white immigrants, angry 
minorities and the civil rights activists for the lack of morals in the area 
and “for obstructing their path to realizing the suburban good life” in the 
1970s and 1980s (Avila 227). 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that in the 1990s a Caucasian, confront-
ing a  city filled with violence and social deviants worse than him, and 
wandering through L.A. with a bagful of weapons reclaimed from a re-
venge-seeking Latino gang, mastered more sympathy from the audience 
nationwide than a pot-smoking dropout who drives around L.A. for rec-
reation. Eventually, however, in this contest of two cowboy-like types, 
the Dude wins without drawing any weapons, because, unlike unstable 
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white-collar D-Fens, who also used to be prone to bouts of aggression as 
a  family man, the Dude represents a consistent, laid-back, unemployed 
single individual, whose lack of typically masculine/military behaviour 
and disregard for forced male responsibilities offer an alternative to the 
craziness and violence of L.A. that also resonated with males all over the 
country, who, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, must have felt 
not only the crisis of identity resulting from the unprecedented increase 
in women’s rights and power, but were also probably eager to avoid the 
post 9/11 military commotion and drop out of yet another imperialis-
tic US intervention waged, in order to, among other things, benefit the 
likes of “the other Jeffrey Lebowski, the millionaire” (TBL). This does 
not mean, however, that the Coens’ unorthodox homage to the Western 
genre and to Los Angeles “as natural extension of the American frontier” 
(Comentale 228) and as the setting of multiple noir classics is devoid of 
violence and demand for justice, the two necessary profit-harvesting in-
gredients in most products of the Dream Factory. The acts of aggression 
and angst in TBL include, among other things, frequent references to 
the Vietnam War, Walter’s angry outbursts triggered by almost everyone 
and everything, a gun in the bowling alley, a disturbing dance number by 
Jesus Quintana—allegedly an ex-pederast with a record, a severed toe and 
a bitten-off ear, repeated threats of genital mutilation, a mug thrown at 
the Dude’s forehead by the sadistic police chief of Malibu—“a real reac-
tionary” (TBL), the accidental shooting, untimely stealing and premedi-
tated burning of the Dude’s car, and, last but not least, Donny’s death 
caused by trauma experienced during the fight between Walter and the 
alleged kidnappers of Bunny Lebowski. All this violence, simultaneously 
suffused and sharpened by the Coens’ stylized cinematography, is as scary 
as it is funny, calling for a hero who feels at home in the City of Angels, 
this “bizarre universe, a shimmering America beyond America” (Comen-
tale 228), because only such an individual could have developed enough 
immunity to survive all the dangers and anxiety that such a mixture of 
weirdness, surrealism and aggression are bound to cause to an average 
man. As Edward P. Comentale observes, the Dude, definitely “a man for 
his time and place,” remains cowboy-style righteous, albeit unarmed and 
unaggressive, 
[T]he film presents the Dude as representative of a lost mode of living, 
a defender of the old easygoing ways against all manner of big city cons. 
A drifter, a dropout, a man extremely slow to provoke, the Dude none-
theless serves to uphold a moral code in a battle against forces that are 
awkwardly juxtaposed, but undeniably modern: big business, big gov-
ernment, fluxus feminists, and German nihilists. (230)
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Although at the time of his debut “a lot about the Dude didn’t make 
a  whole lot of sense” to Americans, “[a]nd a  lot about where he lived, 
likewise,” they eventually found both “durned innarestin.” A “deadbeat” 
might seem like mediocre hero material, but he can still “uphold a moral 
code” without compromising his simple ideals of pacifism and leisure, ide-
als which many were finally able to recognize and embrace as an antidote 
to the aggression-fuelled and war-oriented American life at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century. Geographically and culturally positioned at the 
edge of the country’s landscape, Los Angeles visually enhances the adven-
tures of the Dude, who, on the whole, feels comfortable in its vastness and 
sustains his presence, his “royal we” (TBL), equally well in the Pasadena 
mansion of his namesake and in his own frequently invaded and thrashed 
simple abode. The city’s impressive night-time overview, the characteristic 
Googie architecture, which became an integral part of US scenery in the 
1950s and early 1960s (Martin-Jones 220), and “the everyday feel of [its 
climate] from a low-rent perspective” (Rosenbaum) feature as culturally 
recognizable trademarks, while the Dude’s lack of aggression exposes and 
balances the city’s gratuitous violence, giving the ultimate frontier myth 
a fresh twist.
While basic information has been provided about the film’s main pro-
tagonist and how he might have contributed to the movie’s delayed success, 
little has been said about the other characters, each of whom might provide 
additional insight into what has made TBL a cultural icon regardless of its 
otherness and initial failure. Since each character provides enough material 
for at least a separate essay, they hardly fit into these concluding remarks. 
Yet, it must be mentioned that the critics in 1998 were dissatisfied not only 
with the movie’s narrative structure but also with the characters. Jonathan 
Rosenbaum seemed particularly disappointed, piling up accusation upon 
accusation: “the Coen brothers . . . lin[e] up a succession of autonomous 
freaks”; “All that The Big Lebowski really cares about is the nightmarish-
ness of 90s Los Angeles and the way a couple of dysfunctional 70s types 
endure it”; “The Dude and Sobchak begin as caricatures . . . , but they’re 
allowed to grow into something deeper, if only because the humanist econ-
omy of the Coens’ surrealist vaudeville allows for a couple of human be-
ings within the tapestry of freaks,” while “[the arbitrary narrative] reduces 
everyone else in the movie to a parade of satirical cartoons” (Rosenbaum). 
Undoubtedly, as Roger Ebert more favourably points out, “Los Angeles 
in this film is a zoo of peculiar characters” (Ebert), featuring, among oth-
ers, the Dude’s bowling companion Walter Sobchak (John Goodman), the 
Vietnam veteran connecting the Vietnam War with literally everything; the 
Dude’s landlord Marty (Jack Kehler), an aspiring performer whose “dance 
quintet” and costume can only be out-weirded by the tight purple costume 
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and slow-motion dance of the Dude’s bowling rival Jesus Quintana (John 
Turturro); and, last but not least, the Dude’s “special lady friend,” Maude 
Lebowski (Julianne Moore), the other Lebowski’s artsy daughter, who 
“covers her body with paint and hurls herself through the air in a leather 
harness” (Ebert), and whom Rosenbaum sees as “a nasty parody of a femi-
nist artist,” conveniently ignoring the fact that the financially and artisti-
cally independent Maude actually figures as the titular Big Lebowski (Ju-
lianne Moore observes that while Maude is “almost beyond pretentious,” 
“she’s [also] got all the power” and “the Dude respects Maude for what 
she is and what she does,” which she reciprocates [Green et al. 38]). The 
Coens’ choice “to lin[e] up a succession of autonomous freaks” in TBL 
serves a purpose that Rosenbaum and many other critics failed to appreci-
ate at the time of the film’s theatrical release. While certain characters such 
as the nihilists could be classified as “dysfunctional types” in the sense 
of being a threat to non-violent members of society, others, such as, for 
instance, the Dude’s quirky landlord or even Walter, help redefine “freak-
ishness” as a term denoting choice, openness, freedom, security, and, last 
but not least, a type of unquestionable achievement which does not require 
one to compromise their original values.
Born in Louisville, Kentucky, Hunter S. Thompson aka Raoul Duke 
would certainly embrace the Coens’ “tapestry of freaks,” and so would 
Dylan Moran, an Irish actor and stand-up comedian, who in his 2006 
show quips: “Arnold Schwarzenegger is the governor of California. There 
is a perfectly ordinary English sentence. How did that happen? Do you 
know how that happened? ‘Cause I tell you . . . . He got there by lifting 
things” (Moran). Sarcastic as it is, Moran’s remark, however, pays tribute 
to the Golden State, implicitly contrasting California’s cultural flexibility 
with the more traditional, not to say rigid, culture of, for instance, Great 
Britain. Although no longer governor as of January 2011, Schwarzenegger 
has raised the bar for the unusual in the region yet another notch, simul-
taneously redefining his own long-lasting American Dream. Although all 
the Dude ever lifts is a bowling ball and glasses of White Russian, TBL’s 
shift from a commercially and critically marginal production to a cultur-
ally significant yet inherently offbeat phenomenon measures up to the 
from-rags-to-riches life story of the Austrian bodybuilder-turned-Mr. 
Universe-turned-actor-turned-politician, who, incidentally, after mov-
ing to California trained at Gold’s Gym in Venice, Los Angeles, which 
is where the Dude dwells. The number of both bizarre and classic cul-
tural connections one can draw in relation to TBL is endless, twisted and 
surprisingly gratifying, though the real pleasure lies in just enjoying the 
ride. As Ebert rightly observes, “The Coen brothers’ The Big Lebowski 
is a genial, shambling comedy [which] should come with a warning like 
the one Mark Twain attached to Huckleberry Finn: ‘Persons attempting 
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to find a  plot in it will be shot’” (Ebert). And yet, just like in Twain’s 
unnecessarily censored classic, there is nothing incidental in the Coens’ 
film, a pertinent example of which can be found in the movie’s constant 
play on “the Dude’s trademark verb—to abide—. . . contrasted with Leb-
owski’s—to achieve” (Comentale and Jaffe 20), a distinction which serves 
to defend the Dude’s lazy lifestyle against the unrelenting Puritan work 
ethic. Because even if the Dude is a lazy man and a relic of his recent re-
bellious past, and, thus, the utmost failure among the 1990s’ slackers, in 
time he has proven that, in the parlance of the Port Huron Statement, the 
famous American independence does not have to equal “egotistic indi-
vidualism” or military involvement—“the object is not to have one’s way 
so much as it is to have a way that is one’s own” (“Port Huron”). Finally, 
against The Guardian critic’s prediction, The Big Lebowski did win a prize, 
the 1998 Golden Aries for Best Foreign Film, awarded, coincidentally yet 
more than appropriately, by the Russian Guild of Film Critics. To use the 
Dude’s favourite qualifier: How “far-out” is that? Enough to repeatedly 
toast The Big Lebowski’s rise from a box office bomb to a nation-wide 
cultural event with the Dude’s favourite drink.
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